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ANTARCTICA’S FROZEN TERRITORIAL 
CLAIMS: A MELTDOWN PROPOSAL 
Jill Grob* 
Abstract: Antarctica has been a site of peace and scientific exploration 
for the last fifty years, largely due to a series of agreements known collec-
tively as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). But the continent is not free 
from potential conflicts. A key compromise for ATS parties was the “freez-
ing” of various countries’ territorial claims. However, these territorial 
claims did not go away, but merely remained hidden beneath the surface 
of future policies. The author argues that continued suppression of these 
claims will not further ATS party goals for Antarctica: peace, no military 
activity, and scientific inquiry. Since many countries rely on oil for their 
energy needs, Antarctica may become more desirable for commercial ex-
ploitation if current sources become too expensive. Therefore, latent ter-
ritorial claims could seriously undermine continued compromise by ATS 
parties. Regrettably and unnecessarily, the environment, scientific ad-
vances, and international peace would all be placed at great risk. 
Introduction 
 Antarctica is a barren continent consisting of very little plant or 
animal life, and almost no human activity except for the research ac-
tivities of the scientists that work there.1 As a scientific resource, Ant-
arctica is vast and valuable,2 but beyond that it is a very undesirable 
place for human habitation.3 With its harsh temperatures and a top 
layer of “land” consisting of glacial ice, Antarctica does not possess an 
indigenous population, nor a population that has attempted to colo-
nize and settle the area.4 
 These factors have not prevented some countries from trying to 
claim sovereignty over parts of Antarctica.5 Though inhospitable, Ant-
                                                                                                                      
* Jill Grob is the Senior Production Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
1 See Christopher C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons 5–6, 20 (1998). 
2 See R.M. Laws, Scientific Opportunities in the Antarctic, in The Antarctic Treaty Re-
gime: Law, Environment and Resources 28, 28 (Gillian D. Triggs ed., 1987). 
3 Keith Suter, Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage? 15 (1991). 
4 Joyner, supra note 1, at 20; Laws, supra note 2, at 28; Suter, supra note 3, at 15. 
5 See generally Joyner, supra note 1, at 14–19. 
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arctica contains the possibility of vast riches in the form of mineral re-
sources.6 In the early part of the twentieth century, seven countries 
made competing claims to areas of Antarctica.7 Spanning the globe, 
these claimants included Chile, Argentina, France, Norway, Great Brit-
ain, New Zealand, and Australia.8 In the wake of World War II and with 
Cold War hostilities on the rise, non-claimant nations like the United 
States and the Soviet Union showed increased interest in the disputed 
territory as well.9 To alleviate the conflict, all nine of these countries, 
along with Belgium, Japan, and South Africa, negotiated the Antarctic 
Treaty in Washington, D.C. on December 1, 1959.10 It went into force 
in June of 1961.11 The Treaty did not parse out the competing sover-
eignty claims.12 Instead, it established a system of joint-governance by 
the Treaty parties.13 
 Nonetheless, the sovereignty issue was not completely ignored.14 
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty resolved the competing sovereignty 
claims by, in essence, suspending resolution of the claims until some 
indefinite future date.15 Thus, for the moment, member countries 
have agreed to quiet their sovereignty claims in the greater interest of 
the articulated goals of the Treaty.16 The territorial claims, therefore, 
have merely been “frozen.”17 These claims could resurface at any time 
should a party to the Treaty wish to rekindle its claim.18 Rekindling a 
                                                                                                                      
6 Emilio J. Sahurie, The International Law of Antarctica 433 (1992). 
7 Joyner, supra note 1, at 14. 
8 Jeffrey D. Myhre, The Antarctic Treaty System: Politics, Law, and Diplomacy 
12–15 (1986). 
9 See Christopher C. Joyner & Ethel R. Theis, Eagle over the Ice 26 (1997). 
10 Christopher D. Beeby, The Antarctic Treaty System: Goals, Performance and Impact: The 
Antarctic Treaty as a Conflict-Avoidance Mechanism, in The Antarctic Treaty System in 
World Politics 4, 5 (Arnfinn Jørgensen-Dahl & Willy Østreng eds., 1991). See generally 
The Antarctic Treaty art. IV, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter Ant-
arctic Treaty]. 
11 Suter, supra note 3, at 19. 
12 See Rolph Trolle-Anderson, The Antarctic Scene: Legal and Political Facts, in The Ant-
arctic Treaty Regime: Law Environment and Resources, supra note 2, at 60. 
13 See Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 34; M.J. Peterson, Managing the Frozen 
South 41 (1988). 
14 See Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 34. 
15 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV; see Beeby, supra note 10, at 6 (explaining that 
the Treaty sets the sovereignty issue to the side). 
16 See Beeby, supra note 10, at 7. 
17 Sahurie, supra note 6, at 185; see Suter, supra note 3, at 9. 
18 See Sahurie, supra note 6, at 303 (highlighting the complexities of territorial claims 
if the Treaty ever ceases to be in force). 
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claim, however, would violate Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.19 Such 
a violation could threaten the delicate balance that holds Treaty par-
ties together and perhaps cause the entire Treaty system to collapse.20 
 Although preserving these sovereignty claims may have been a 
brilliant political compromise in 1959, it poses problems for 2007 and 
beyond.21 Part I of this Note explains the history of territorial claims 
to Antarctica, the history of the Antarctic Treaty, and how the issues of 
mineral resource activity and territorial sovereignty have been treated 
in the past. Part II explains competing theories relating to Antarctica 
and their application to the sovereignty and mineral resource di-
lemma. Part III weighs the costs and benefits of eliminating the frozen 
territorial claims and proposes that they should be eliminated from 
the Treaty. If the three goals of the 1959 Treaty are truly the goals to 
which the Treaty parties aspire, then this solution will assure that the 
Treaty manifests in practice what it aspires to do in its text.22 This so-
lution serves the current interest in protecting the Antarctic envi-
ronment, and the world environment, from the harms of mining in 
Antarctica.23 If the situation were to change in the future and Antarc-
tica were to become a necessary source of mineral resources for the 
world’s people,24 Antarctica’s de-claimed status would better facilitate 
a plan for mining the resources.25 Without any national interests at 
stake—with all the potential and actual territorial claims eliminated— 
Treaty parties could best negotiate a solution for resource allocation 
that is in the interest of all nations.26 
                                                                                                                      
19 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV(2) (proclaiming that “[n]o new claim, or 
enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted 
while the present Treaty is in force”). 
20 See Beeby, supra note 10, at 18. 
21 See Arnfinn Jørgensen-Dahl & Willy Østreng, Introduction: The Antarctic Challenge, in 
The Antarctic Treaty System in World Politics, supra note 10, at 1. 
22 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, arts. I-III. But see Trolle-Anderson, supra note 12, 
at 59. 
23 See Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 139. 
24 See Geoffrey Larminie, The Mineral Potential of Antarctica: The State of the Art, in The 
Antarctic Treaty System in World Politics, supra note 10, at 91; see also Peterson, 
supra note 13, at 13 (explaining the importance of changing technologies in the Antarctic 
context); EIA, Country Analysis Briefs, Antarctica: Fact Sheet, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
emeu/cabs/antarctica.html (“Antarctica’s serenely primitive wilderness faces an uncertain 
future as debate continues over the question of tapping into the continent's wealth of 
mineral resources.”) (last visited Apr. 24, 2007). 
25 See Sahurie, supra note 6, at 439–40 (noting that increased outside interest in ex-
ploiting oil resources in Antarctica led to interest by Treaty parties to address the issue). 
26 Joe Verhoeven, General Introduction, in The Antarctic Environment and Interna-
tional Law 11, 14 ( Joe Verhoeven et al. eds., 1992); see infra Part III.D. 
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I. Background 
A. History of Claims to Antarctica 
 Britain was the first country to claim sovereignty over an area of 
Antarctica in 1908.27 New Zealand advanced the next claim in 1923, 
followed by France in 1924.28 The next claims were made by Australia 
in 1933, Norway in 1939, and Chile in 1940.29 Argentina made a series 
of claims starting in 1927, refining its claim up until 1957.30 These 
countries proposed a variety of justifications for their claims, including 
discovery, occupation, geographical proximity, geographical affinity, 
and sector theories.31 Regardless of the justifications for the claims, all 
seven of these claims manifest the idea that Antarctica is a space that 
can be claimed.32 
 All seven of the aforementioned claimant countries were parties to 
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.33 The five non-claimant nations that 
rounded out the parties to the 1959 Treaty were Belgium, Japan, South 
Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States.34 Of those five coun-
tries, the Soviet Union and the United States reserved the right to 
make claims in the future, which was acknowledged in Article IV of the 
Treaty.35 Thus, the Soviet Union and the United States occupy a middle 
ground between the seven pure claimant states and the three other 
non-claimant states.36 Of the seven claimant states, only Australia, New 
Zealand, Norway, France, and Great Britain recognize the claims of the 
others.37 The United States and Soviet Union, however, abide by a “no 
claims” principle, whereby they assert no claims and acknowledge no 
claims by others, while still reserving the right to make future claims.38 
The three other non-claimant countries agreed to the frozen claims 
                                                                                                                      
27 Suter, supra note 3, at 16. 
28 Myhre, supra note 8, at 14–15. 
29 Id. at 13–15. 
30 Id. at 12–13. 
31 See generally id. at 7–15. 
32 Peterson, supra note 13, at 35. 
33 Id. at 40–41. 
34 Id. 
35 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV(1)(a) (explicitly reserving such rights); 
Suter, supra note 3, at 16. 
36 See Suter, supra note 3, at 16. 
37 Gillian D. Triggs, Introduction, in The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, Environ-
ment and Resources, supra note 2, at 52. 
38 Suter, supra note 3, at 16; see Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 39–40. 
2007] Antarctica’s Frozen Territorial Claims 465 
and did not acknowledge the claims of claimant-countries, yet did not 
reserve a right to advance future claims.39 
 Additional nations have ratified the Treaty over the years, includ-
ing India and China in 1983, and Cuba in 1984.40 By ratifying the 
Treaty, these countries agreed to the compromise in Article IV to freeze 
past territorial claims and also agreed not to advance any new claims of 
their own.41 Some developing nations, however, as well as the United 
Nations (U.N.), have expressed the view that Antarctica is the type of 
territory that cannot be claimed by any nation.42 Even some of the 
original treaty parties that made claims in the past now agree with this 
viewpoint.43 A variety of justifications exist for the idea that Antarctica 
should remain unclaimed, ranging from the philosophical to the prac-
tical.44 The philosophical reason advanced is that Antarctica is a “global 
commons,” meaning that the territory cannot be owned by any one 
nation, but rather is owned, in a sense, by all nations.45 The more prac-
tical reason is that Antarctica is a large area within which the potential 
for environmental damage is great, with detrimental effects that could 
reach all nations of the world.46 Under this view, Antarctica should be 
designated as a “world park” so that all nations can benefit from the 
positive effects of its preservation.47 
B. History of Mineral Resources in Antarctica 
 Beyond its scientific value, Antarctica has the potential to become 
a commercial resource as well.48 Geological evidence suggests that Ant-
                                                                                                                      
39 Davor Vidas, The Antarctic Treaty System in the International Community: An Overview, in 
Governing the Antarctic 35, 36–37 n.5 (Olav Schram Stokke & Davor Vidas eds., 1996) 
[hereinafter Overview]; Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 36. 
40 See Francisco Orrego Vicuña, Antarctic Mineral exploitation: The Emerg-
ing Legal Framework 533–39 (1988) (featuring a table listing all parties and the addi-
tional Antarctic measures that they ratified). 
41 See Joyner, supra note 1, at 61. 
42 See id. at 247; Myhre, supra note 8, at 113. 
43 See G.A. Res. 45/78, Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/78 (Dec. 12, 1990) (“Welcom-
ing the initiative taken by some Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties in promoting Antarc-
tica as a nature reserve or world park and the banning of prospecting and mining in and 
around Antarctica . . . .”). 
44 See Joyner, supra note 1, at 25–26. 
45 See id. 
46 Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 139; see Jorge Berguno, The Antarctic Park: The Issue 
of Environmental Protection, in The Antarctic Environment and International Law, 
supra note 26, at 106. 
47 See Joyner, supra note 1, at 175; Peterson, supra note 13, at 118. 
48 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities Preamble, 
opened for signature Nov. 25, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 868 (1988) (noting the possibility 
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arctica may contain vast stores of oil.49 The U.S. economy is particularly 
dependent upon this resource.50 The Antarctic Treaty was silent on 
how to treat the discovery of mineral resources such as oil for the same 
reason it was silent on solving the sovereignty issue—the conflicts over 
how to resolve both issues were too difficult to tackle in the Cold War 
political climate.51 The fragile status of competing sovereignty claims 
would complicate resolution of the mineral resource issue, since inter-
ests could easily overlap or collide.52 Historically, it has not been com-
mercially viable to search for these resources in Antarctica due to the 
climatic conditions and the current perception that the chance of dis-
covery is slight.53 Scientific studies on the continent, however, could 
incidentally unearth discoveries of commercial value.54 If a mineral re-
source were discovered in a particular area, it seems very likely that a 
country that had shelved its sovereignty claim to that area in 1959 
might attempt to reassert its claim.55 
C. Underlying Issues: Politics and Science 
 Of the seven claimed areas of Antarctica, only the territorial claims 
of Britain, Argentina, and Chile overlap.56 While the other four claims 
do not overlap, the Antarctic areas in which Britain, Argentina, and 
Chile made competing claims cover one fifth of the Antarctic conti-
nent.57 During the 1940s and 1950s, these overlapping areas created 
tension and led countries like the United States to fear that the dispute 
could give rise to war.58 Signs pointed in that direction.59 A few war-like 
                                                                                                                      
that exploitable mineral resources may exist in Antarctica) [hereinafter CRAMRA]; Sa-
hurie, supra note 6, at 424, 427. 
49 See Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 136. But see Larminie, supra note 24, at 86 (ex-
plaining that Antarctica does not have great petroleum potential in comparison to other 
areas of the world). 
50 See Suter, supra note 3, at 1. 
51 Beeby, supra note 10, at 5; Sahurie, supra note 6, at 433. 
52 Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 35. 
53 Larminie, supra note 24, at 82 (explaining that mineral resource exploration in Ant-
arctica is prohibitively expensive); Myhre, supra note 8, at 27 (explaining that the United 
States believed at the time the Treaty was negotiated that the economic value of Antarctica 
was negligible). 
54 Beeby, supra note 10, at 8 (explaining that it will always be rumored that science is 
merely a cover for “other national ambitions”). See generally Sahurie, supra note 6, at 352–
56 (relying on the implicit assumption that the status of these mineral resources has been 
discovered through scientific inquiry). 
55 See Peterson, supra note 13, at 2. 
56 Suter, supra note 3, at 16. 
57 Myhre, supra note 8, at 14. 
58 See Beeby, supra note 10, at 5. 
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scuffles occurred in the southern hemisphere among the three claim-
ant states from 1947–48.60 From a political standpoint, the United 
States became concerned that it would need to choose sides.61 All three 
of the countries were U.S. allies, and the United States did not want to 
make a choice  between friends.62 
 Antarctica was also a site of Cold War political strain.63 Both the 
United States and the Soviet Union established bases on Antarctica 
for various pursuits.64 To strengthen its presence in Antarctica, the 
United States began to train military personnel and test equipment in 
Antarctic conditions in 1946–47.65 The United States was not the only 
country that was feeling insecure about the military status of Antarc-
tica.66 Australia, for example, was fearful of the Soviet Union’s in-
creasing presence in Antarctica, especially after Soviet scientists raised 
the Soviet flag over a scientific base established in a part of Australia’s 
Antarctic claim.67 The action of the Soviet scientists did not concern 
the scientists in Antarctica, but it did concern political leaders.68 Ac-
tions in Antarctica by any country were watched with a wary eye by 
countries on both sides of Cold War politics, even those actions con-
ducted under the auspices of scientific exploration.69 
 Despite these political insecurities, scientists were working to 
peacefully unite the world through a cooperative research program 
called the International Geophysical Year (IGY).70 This program lasted 
eighteen months, from July 1, 1957 until December 31, 1958.71 The 
program consisted of a coordinated effort among scientists to study the 
entire natural world.72 Because of its success, the program was ex-
tended an additional year, although its name changed to International 
Geophysical Cooperation (IGC)-1959.73 In Antarctica, the activities of 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Myhre, supra note 8, at 14. 
60 See id.; see, e.g., Suter, supra note 3, at 17. 
61 See Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 149–50. 
62 See id.; Peterson, supra note 13, at 54. 
63 Beeby, supra note 10, at 5. 
64 See Lorraine M. Elliott, International Environmental Politics 28 (1994); 
Myhre, supra note 8, at 31. 
65 Elliott, supra note 64, at 28. 
66 See Myhre, supra note 8, at 31. 
67 Id.; see Suter, supra note 3, at 18. 
68 See Suter, supra note 3, at 18. 
69 See Peterson, supra note 13, at 68. 
70 Suter, supra note 3, at 18. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Myhre, supra note 8, at 31. 
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scientists participating in the IGY took place at fifty different scientific 
bases, and were conducted by twelve different countries.74 Out of this 
background of political fears and scientific aspirations, the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959 took shape.75 
D. The Antarctic Treaty and Its Progeny 
 The United States initiated the Antarctic Treaty by inviting the 
eleven other interested countries to Washington, D.C. to discuss the 
matter.76  The Antarctic Treaty articulated three main goals: first, to 
promote peace in Antarctica; second, to ensure that Antarctica would 
not be used for military activity; third, to encourage scientific research 
in Antarctica.77 The first two goals stemmed from sovereignty conflicts 
and Cold War concerns.78 Peace was important to all Treaty members 
because none wanted to go to war over the conflicting sovereignty 
claims.79 Antarctica also appeared to be a potential site for another 
Cold War arms race.80 The United States feared that the Soviet Union 
would use Antarctica for military purposes.81 Fortunately, the third 
goal, of encouraging scientific research, facilitated peace and demilita-
rization because it would benefit all Treaty parties; the immeasurable 
benefits of scientific inquiry paved the way for political compromise.82 
 Since its creation, the Antarctic Treaty has evolved to include 
twenty-six Consultative parties and seventeen Contracting parties.83 The 
difference between Consultative and Contracting party status is slight, 
but significant.84 The twelve original treaty parties were all granted 
Consultative party status by the Treaty.85 Under Article IX, these na-
tions can attend yearly meetings and can vote on policies relating to 
                                                                                                                      
74 Suter, supra note 3, at 18. 
75 Myhre, supra note 8, at 31–32. 
76 Peterson, supra note 13, at 40. 
77 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, arts. I–III. 
78 See Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 146. 
79 See Trolle-Anderson, supra note 12, at 60. 
80 See Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 150. 
81 Id. at 26. 
82 See Jonathan I. Charney, The Antarctic System and Customary International Law, in In-
ternational Law for Antarctica 51, 91 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 
1996) (describing the Treaty as a quid pro quo with claimant-states agreeing to suspend 
claims for the benefit of a cooperative agreement); Trolle-Anderson, supra note 12, at 59–
60. 
83 Joyner, supra note 1, at 49. 
84 See id. (noting that Consultative parties can attend meetings and vote on Antarctic 
issues, while Contracting parties cannot). 
85 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, art. IX(1); Sahurie, supra note 6, at 11. 
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Antarctica at those meetings.86 Article XIII articulates the procedure 
whereby other nations can become Treaty members.87 For a nation that 
ratifies the Treaty to achieve Consultative party status, it must “con-
duc[t] substantial scientific research activity [in Antarctica].”88 This re-
quirement indirectly imposes an investment requirement as well.89 
Given its location and climatic conditions, conducting research on Ant-
arctica is expensive 90 This requirement effectively prohibits developing 
countries from voting on Antarctic issues, since they cannot meet the 
monetary demand inherent in Consultative party status.91 A lesser 
status, however, can be attained by an interested nation that simply rati-
fies the Treaty but does not meet the scientific research requirement.92 
This Contracting party status obliges a nation to follow the Antarctic 
Treaty, but does not allow the nation any voice in Antarctic govern-
ance.93 Seventeen nations have chosen this status,94 but it is question-
able whether that status was a “choice,” or dictated by monetary con-
straints.95 
 The Antarctic Treaty expanded to include Recommendations 
and policies adopted at yearly meetings, conducted as per the original 
Treaty articles.96 Thus, the Treaty became more than just a Treaty, and 
is often referred to now as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).97 Spe-
cial conferences were held over the years to develop various Protocols, 
some of which the Consultative parties eventually ratified.98 So long as 
all Consultative parties ratify a protocol, these measures become part 
of the ATS.99 Adopted measures have no force until ratified.100 
                                                                                                                      
86 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, art. IX(1); Sahurie, supra note 6, at 11. 
87 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, art. XIII. 
88 See id. art. IX(2); Peterson, supra note 13, at 43. 
89 Joyner, supra note 1, at 48. 
90 Id.; see Sahurie, supra note 6, at 9 (describing the U.S. budgetin Antarctica). 
91 See Rajmah Hussain, The Antarctic: Common Heritage of Mankind?, in The Antarctic 
Environment And International Law, supra note 26, at 89. 
92 See Myhre, supra note 8, at 39; Suter, supra note 3, at 23. 
93 See Peterson, supra note 13, at 100–01. 
94 Joyner, supra note 1, at 49. 
95 See Peterson, supra note 13, at 101. 
96 See, e.g., Recommendation XI-1, Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting XI, Antarctic 
mineral resources (1981), available at http://aspire.nvi.net/gendoc.plx?l1=1981&db=1 [here-
inafter Recommendation XI-1 (1981)]. 
97 See generally Overview, supra note 39, at 35–39. 
98 See, e.g., Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, special Con-
sultative meeting, 27th Sess., ATSCM/2/3/2, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (1991) [hereinafter Madrid 
Protocol]; Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 
1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, T.I.A.S. No. 10240 [hereinafter CCAMLR]. 
99 See Sahurie, supra note 6, at 11 (explaining the consensus requirement). 
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 The first successful, large-scale addition to the Antarctic Treaty was 
the 1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and 
Fauna.101 Next came the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Ant-
arctic Seals (Seals Convention).102 After the Seals Convention entered 
into force in 1978, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was discussed in 1980 and was 
ratified in 1982.103 
E. CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol 
 The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources 
(CRAMRA) took six years to finalize.104 Discussions and meetings oc-
curred from 1982–88 and a special Consultative meeting adopted the 
convention on December 2, 1988 in Wellington, New Zealand.105 The 
agreement—the first of its kind—delineated a plan for handling the 
mining of mineral resources in Antarctica.106 It was never ratified.107 
Consensus among Treaty members is required for measures to become 
effective.108 France and Australia pulled back their support for envi-
ronmental reasons, thereby preventing CRAMRA from becoming part 
of the ATS.109 
 Three years later, in 1991, the Consultative parties negotiated the 
Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, referred 
to as the Madrid Protocol.110 This Protocol places a fifty-year morato-
rium on mining for mineral resources in Antarctica.111 The Madrid 
Protocol reflects an entirely different assessment of mineral resources 
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. 
101 Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 44. See generally Agreed Measures for the Conserva-
tion of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, June 2–13, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S. No. 6058 
(1966), modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 7692(1973) [hereinafter Agreed Meas-
ures]. 
102 See generally Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 
U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826 (1976–77) [hereinafter Seals Convention]. 
103 Elliott, supra note 64, at 91; see generally CCAMLR, supra note 98. 
104 Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 108. See generally CRAMRA, supra note 48. 
105 Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 108. See generally CRAMRA, supra note 48. 
106 See Suter, supra note 3, at 59–60. 
107 See id. at 59. 
108 Sahurie, supra note 6, at 11. 
109 See Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 77. 
110 Madrid Protocol, supra note 98; Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 179. 
111 Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 180; Francesco Francioni, Introduction, in Inter-
national Law For Antarctica, supra note 82, at 3. 
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and the environment.112 Rather than regulate mining to protect the 
environment, which CRAMRA tried to do, the Madrid Protocol out-
right prohibits mining.113 The ban, however, is not permanent.114 The 
Protocol can be amended to lift the mining ban with majority vote by 
the current Consultative parties within the fifty years immediately fol-
lowing January 14, 1998.115 After the fifty years expire, the ban can be 
lifted by a majority of current Consultative parties.116 While mining is 
currently prohibited, mining could take place in Antarctica in the fu-
ture if Treaty parties change their positions.117 
F. The ATS and the United Nations 
 The U.N. would like to play a greater role in Antarctic policy, but 
the ATS has yet to include it.118 The twelve initial Treaty parties actu-
ally preferred that the system function independent of the U.N.119 
Since the ATS involved exchanging frozen claims for benefits of a uni-
fied system, those frozen claims could be threatened if the U.N. took 
over with its system.120 Under the ATS, only those nations with a 
“stake” in Antarctica have a voice in Antarctic policy.121 The require-
ment of “substantial scientific research” in Antarctica serves to limit 
the group of nations that can take part in Antarctic policy-making.122 
In a way, the smaller scale of this governing system has facilitated the 
many recommendations and policies that the ATS has developed over 
the years.123 If it were easier to attain Consultative party status, it 
would be more difficult for the entire group to achieve consensus on 
matters.124 
                                                                                                                      
112 Madrid Protocol, supra note 98, art. 3(1); Davor Vidas, The Antarctic Treaty System 
and the Law of the Sea: A New Dimension Introduced by the Protocol, in Governing the Ant-
arctic, supra note 39, at 77 [hereinafter New Dimension]. 
113 New Dimension, supra note 112, at 77. 
114 Joyner, supra note 1, at 153. 
115 Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 180; see also Australian Government Antarctic Divi-
sion, The Madrid Protocol, Entry Into Force [hereinafter Entry Into Force], available at 
http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=825 (explaining that the parties opened the 
Madrid Protocol for signature on October 4, 1991, but it did not enter into force until 
January 14, 1998) (last visited Apr. 24, 2007). 
116 Joyner & Theis, supra note 9, at 180. 
117 See Charney, supra note 82, at 89. 
118 G.A. Res. 45/78, supra note 43; see Hussain, supra note 91, at 89, 91. 
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 The significant barrier to Consultative status has not stopped de-
veloping countries that are members of the U.N. from utilizing the 
U.N. as a stage to discuss their Antarctic concerns.125 The U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly has issued various resolutions over the years pertaining 
to Antarctica.126 These resolutions reflect a concern that even though 
scientific research in Antarctica might be cost-prohibitive for some 
nations, all nations have a stake in the global environment.127 Insofar 
as research and other activities in Antarctica could affect the global 
climate, oceans, and ozone, every nation has a stake.128 A December 
1990 G.A. Resolution recognizes “the particular significance of Ant-
arctica to the international community in terms, inter alia, of interna-
tional peace and security, environment, its effects on global climatic 
conditions, economy and scientific research . . . .”129 Attempts to util-
ize the U.N. paid off for those nations that thought their voices were 
not being heard.130 After the U.N. made Antarctica a talking point in 
the early 1980s, the non-Consultative parties were granted access to 
regular and special Consultative meetings.131 U.N. power, however, is 
limited.132 Although the U.N. Security Council could issue binding 
resolutions pertaining to Antarctica, as opposed to the observational 
General Assembly resolutions, Consultative parties in the U.N. could 
easily exercise a veto.133 A transfer of power from the ATS to the U.N. 
would not sit well with Consultative parties, thus the veto would 
probably be exercised.134 
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II. Discussion 
A. Theories of Title 
 Claimant states asserted title to Antarctica using a variety of title-
acquisition theories.135 Under international law, however, there is only 
one manner by which a country may obtain title to Antarctica.136 Since 
Antarctica is uninhabited terrain, a country can only acquire title to it 
by occupation.137 When occupation is unrealistic or impossible, the 
mere will to act as sovereign will suffice.138 The inquiry concerning 
when occupation becomes “unrealistic or impossible” is highly fact-
specific.139 It is disputed whether any country has effectively “occupied” 
Antarctica to justify a claim to sovereignty, yet claims began to surface at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.140 
B. Conflicting Theories of Contested Antarctic Territory 
 Great Britain’s claim was based on inchoate title through discov-
ery, and the perfection of this title through occupation of its scientific 
bases on Antarctica.141 Great Britain also utilizes the sector theory to 
expand its claim beyond the scientific bases it occupies.142 Under the 
sector theory, claimants can claim larger areas than they occupy based 
on proximity.143 Utilizing coastlines and the meridians, claimants will 
outline their particular “sector,” extending beyond an area they actu-
ally occupy.144 International law has not validated the sector theory as 
a legitimate way to acquire title to land.145 Nonetheless, Great Britain 
along with Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, and New Zealand all 
use the theory to claim additional areas.146 In fact, Norway is the only 
country of the seven claimant countries to reject this theory.147 
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 Argentina’s claimed area includes the Antarctic Peninsula, an area 
within Great Britain’s claim that is known for its mineral resource po-
tential.148 In addition to a claim based on occupation, Argentina 
backed its claim with geographical proximity, referred to as “contigu-
ity,” and geographical affinity.149 Neither of these theories are recog-
nized in international law.150 The contiguity theory, if recognized, 
would require the territories of Argentina and Antarctica to be con-
nected.151 The 700-mile distance between Argentina and the claimed 
territory is hardly “contiguous.”152 The geographical affinity theory is 
perhaps even more far-fetched.153 This theory proposes that the Andes 
submerge at a certain point in Argentina and then resurface in the 
south as the Antarctic Peninsula.154 Thus, even if not contiguous to the 
naked eye, the lands are still connected by their likeness to one an-
other.155 
 Not until 1940 did Chile officially declare the outlines of the Chil-
ean Antarctic Territory.156 The decree did not establish new titles, but 
rather acknowledged pre-existing rights in the area.157 Chile then estab-
lished a scientific base in the South Shetland Islands in 1947, an area 
within Argentina’s and Great Britain’s claims.158 Great Britain tried to 
resolve the issue through international arbitration, but Chile refused 
the court’s jurisdiction.159 The Antarctic Treaty effectively took the heat 
off these disputes and froze the claims.160 Although this did not resolve 
the underlying disputes, it ensured peace in Antarctica.161 
C. The Mineral Resource Issue 
 There are two issues relating to mineral resources in Antarctica: 
first, whether they exist; and second, whether it is economically viable 
to extract them.162 The Gondwanaland hypothesis supports the idea 
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that mineral resources exist in Antarctica.163 Based on this concept, 
Antarctica used to be part of a larger land mass.164 Thousands of years 
ago this larger land mass broke apart, into the seven respective conti-
nents.165 Since mineral resources have been found on the other con-
tinents, the hypothesis suggests that Antarctica contains mineral re-
sources as well.166 Deposits of coal and iron have been found in 
Antarctica, supporting the hypothesis.167 Even though it is likely min-
eral resources exist in Antarctica, their extraction is an entirely differ-
ent matter.168 
 Extraction of mineral resources in Antarctica can be reduced to 
simple economic cost-benefit analyses.169 Antarctica’s location and cli-
matic conditions contribute to high projected extraction costs.170 Stud-
ies suggest, however, that the deposits in Antarctica could be quite 
large, thereby making extraction profitable.171 The demand for such 
resources in the market is another factor in this analysis.172 High de-
mand could increase prices, thus making the extraction more profit-
able.173 These variables are all subject to change based on fluctuations 
in the market for certain mineral resources, especially oil, as well as 
changing technologies that facilitate extraction in the harsh Antarctic 
climate.174 With the adoption of the Madrid Protocol, the ATS prohib-
its mining.175 Therefore, whether the minerals exist and, if so, how 
profitable it might be to extract them, is immaterial until some future 
time when the ban might be lifted.176 
D. The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle 
 Some developing nations have argued that Antarctica should be 
considered the “common heritage of mankind” (CHM).177 This con-
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troversial argument posits that areas that cannot be owned by any na-
tion should be regulated for the benefit of all nations.178 Even before 
the theory was discussed in the 1970s,179 the 1959 Antarctic Treaty re-
flected its ideals.180 The preamble “[r]ecogniz[es] that it is in the in-
terest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or 
object of international discord” (emphasis added).181 While the 
Treaty does not overtly state that Antarctica is owned by all nations, it 
does resonate with the idea that all nations have an “interest” in Ant-
arctica.182 The 1991 Madrid Protocol also adopted some of the com-
mon heritage principle ideals, but it did not go so far as to officially 
adopt the common heritage principle.183 The Protocol does, however, 
“designate Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and sci-
ence.”184 The U.N. alluded to the principle in a 1991 General Assem-
bly Resolution which “[a]ffirm[ed] its conviction that, in the interest 
of all mankind, Antarctica should continue for ever to be used exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes and that it should not become the scene 
or object of international discord . . . .”185 If applied in Antarctica, the 
principle would require that the world community obtain ownership 
rights, including mineral resource rights, in Antarctica.186 Any coun-
try choosing to exploit Antarctica’s mineral resources would have to 
share its profits with the entire world.187 The only official adoption of 
the CHM principle was in the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, which applied to the deep-sea bed.188 Therefore, 
whether CHM is an international standard is highly debatable, since it 
has only been applied in one context thus far, and in that context it 
was considered a failure.189 The ATS, which evokes the CHM with its 
language regarding the “interest of all mankind,” does not expressly 
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invoke its attendant consequences: shared profits from mineral re-
sources in Antarctica.190 
E. Designation of Antarctica as a “Global Commons” 
 The ATS is recognized for its novel approach to a global com-
mons area.191 The System has even served as a model for other inter-
national “commons”, such as Outer Space.192 There are six character-
istics of “global commons”: 
(1) The area is physically and legally situated beyond the lim-
its of national jurisdiction. (2) There are no recognized or 
valid national sovereignty claims that pertain to the area. 
(3) The area is presumed to be indivisible, and not politically 
enclosable . . . . (4) . . . universal access to the area. (5) The 
effects of abuse or mismanagement of the area are experi-
enced universally . . . . (6)The risk to the commons area in-
creases when states or their nationals conduct activities 
there.193 
A main problem in defining Antarctica as a “global commons” con-
cerns the second characteristic.194 If one looks at how Antarctica is 
treated, then it is not a “global commons” since some countries have 
sought to claim it, and some reserve the right to claim it in the fu-
ture.195 Since the Treaty freezes the territorial claims, however, Ant-
arctica is treated as if no nation owns it.196 
 The 1980 World Conservation Strategy mentioned Antarctica and 
its status as a “global commons” in its efforts to ensure that economic 
development is coupled with sound conservation practices.197 It de-
fined a “global commons” as “parts of the earth’s surface beyond na-
tional jurisdictions—notably the open ocean and the living resources 
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found there—or held in common—notably the atmosphere.”198 Poli-
cymakers are primarily concerned with global commons spaces be-
cause of the potential for humans to exploit the resources in those 
spaces to the detriment of the global environment.199 Economic bene-
fits, therefore, are more the hallmark of CHM than they are of the 
“global commons” theories.200 
F. Status of Antarctica as a “World Park” 
 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the U.N. endorse 
the idea that Antarctica should be a world park.201 In a 1991 General 
Assembly Resolution, the U.N. alluded to some Consultative parties 
that share in this view by “[w]elcoming the increasing support, includ-
ing by some Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, for the establish-
ment of Antarctica as a nature reserve or world park to ensure the 
protection and conservation of its environment and its dependent 
and associated ecosystems for the benefit of all mankind.”202 While 
the world park view incorporates many of the ideas already practiced 
in Antarctica, such as the promotion of science and peace, the thrust 
of the world park concept is the environment.203 
 Greenpeace has been very active in advertising its belief that Ant-
arctica should be designated a world park.204 Looking at the values it 
sets forth in achieving this agenda helps elucidate the characteristics of 
a world park.205 Greenpeace promotes four principles pertaining to 
Antarctica.206 All four principles echo the current status of the ATS pol-
icy in Antarctica.207 The first Greenpeace principle makes the environ-
ment of paramount concern; the second advocates “complete protec-
tion of Antarctica’s wildlife”; the third wishes Antarctica to remain “a 
zone of international scientific co-operation”; and the fourth wishes 
Antarctica to remain peaceful and weapon-free.208 
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 The recent Madrid Protocol embodies the first principle, since it 
creates an environmental protocol that effectively sublimates all other 
interests to those of the environment.209 The second principle was 
already accomplished in CCAMLR, as well as the Seals Convention.210 
The third and fourth principles were addressed even before Green-
peace began advocating its view that Antarctica should be a world 
park—the Treaty itself adopts peace and demilitarization as two of its 
goals.211 
III. Analysis 
A. Eliminating Territorial Claims 
 At a point when no particular nation stands to gain from exploita-
tion of mineral resources in areas of Antarctica, Consultative Treaty 
parties should eliminate all claims and potential claims to sovereignty 
over Antarctica.212 As it stands now, under the Madrid Protocol of 1991, 
mining in Antarctica is banned until 2048.213 Nonetheless, Treaty par-
ties have never attempted to eliminate the various types of territorial 
claims that exist in Antarctica.214 
 On the one hand, the freezing of territorial claims binds the en-
tire ATS system together.215 Unfortunately, as a result, all future com-
promises, recommendations, and protocols are predicated on that 
one, initial compromise.216 The Treaty’s goals of peace and scientific 
research, however, are not related to territorial claims to Antarctica, 
except insofar as they were politically bartered for one another.217 
These meaningless territorial claims should not continue to underlie 
current and future Antarctic measures.218 
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B. Obstacles to Melting the Territorial Claims 
 One explanation for the perpetuation of these claims is that 
change is hard to effectuate in a consensus-only environment.219 One 
important reason for Consultative parties to relinquish claims over Ant-
arctica is because those claims thwart the creation of Antarctic policy.220 
The failure of CRAMRA highlights this roadblock to policy-making.221 
Making it even more difficult to reach consensus, Consultative parties 
are those that can afford scientific research in Antarctica and therefore 
have no reason to entertain the viewpoints of those that cannot.222 
These nations can also afford the steep costs of mineral extraction in 
the harsh Antarctic conditions.223 Consultative parties, then, are ada-
mantly against the application of CHM to Antarctica.224 The CHM 
principle demands that countries that can afford to do the work of 
mineral extraction also distribute the profits of any potential discover-
ies to countries that cannot.225 Since countries with claims have no in-
centive to share the resources, they are essentially hoarding their frozen 
claims for the possibility that mineral resources will be discovered in 
the future.226 By eliminating the incentive to hoard the frozen territo-
rial claims, policymaking in Antarctica would be improved.227 
1. CHM 
 Despite the faults of the current system, the CHM does not ade-
quately address the Antarctica situation.228 The CHM principle is prob-
lematic not only for countries with claims, but for those without claims 
as well.229 For example, as it has been implemented in the past, the 
CHM does not give enough deference to environmental concerns.230 
Instead, it focuses on sharing the benefits of mineral resources that ex-
ist in areas beyond national jurisdiction.231 When preservation of the 
environment has become a paramount concern in Antarctica, as evi-
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denced by the Madrid Protocol and its ban on mining, CHM ceases to 
be helpful.232 
2. World Park 
 Transforming Antarctica into a world park would not serve the 
interests of the ATS.233 On the one hand, some Consultative parties are 
open to Antarctica being made into a world park.234 One benefit of this 
internal movement towards world park status is that such status would 
necessarily render the territorial claims moot.235 
 One problem, however, with officially transforming Antarctica into 
a world park is that it could limit scientific studies on the continent, 
such as the CCAMLR Ecosystem Monetary Program (CEMP).236 The 
current position created by the ATS strikes a healthy balance between 
protecting the environment and allowing Antarctica to be utilized for 
scientific knowledge.237 Changing Antarctica into a world park would 
thus not mesh with the goal of the Antarctic Treaty that relates to scien-
tific research.238 The Consultative parties can, however, continue with 
the environmental protection scheme of the Madrid Protocol to ensure 
the protection of the Antarctic environment and, instead of declaring it 
a world park, just agree to drop the territorial claims.239 
3. Clinging to Claims 
 Another problem with convincing Consultative parties to drop 
their territorial claims is that they have repeatedly articulated their in-
terest in holding onto those claims.240 For example, the Recommenda-
tions issued by the Consultative parties in 1977 and 1981 emphasized 
the continuance of Article IV, which suspended the resolution of all 
claims to sovereignty until an unspecified future date.241 Specifically, 
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Recommendation IX-1 expressly stated a desire to ensure that “the pro-
visions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty shall not be affected by [a 
future mineral resources regime].”242 In light of CRAMRA’s failure and 
the subsequent adoption of the Madrid Protocol with its fifty year ban 
on mining, the relevancy of all frozen claims is uncertain.243 Especially 
when either consensus or a majority is required to lift the ban, the 
status quo seems to be that no one will be able to profit from a mineral 
resource being discovered within a latent territorial claim.244 Because 
the system holds these claims in perpetual stasis, the claims these na-
tions hold are essentially valueless.245 Therefore, these claims should be 
dropped.246 
C. Additional Considerations 
 One major drawback of a proposal to drop all territorial claims is 
that it could cause the ATS to collapse.247 Nonetheless, the flow of po-
litical pressure and the resulting Protocols have evidenced a para-
mount concern for the environment above any economic concerns.248 
The timing, therefore, seems ripe for such a change in the ATS.249 
 In addition, the elimination of territorial claims may or may not 
implicate increased U.N. involvement.250 After the Madrid Protocol, 
nations advocating the CHM principle were less interested in Antarc-
tica, since it seemed like there was no potential for resources to be 
exploited there.251 Similarly, Consultative parties with claims or poten-
tial claims might lose interest in maintaining an independent system 
given the loss of the latent territorial claims.252 On the other hand, 
seventeen nations were interested in becoming Contracting parties, 
which suggests some advantage to having the ATS function independ-
ent of the U.N.253 
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 If the ATS breaks down over Article IV disputes, the outcome of 
the Article IV compromise would be uncertain.254 The status of Antarc-
tica—claimed, claimable, or unclaimable—would be up in the air.255 
For this reason, the ATS should adapt itself before mineral resources 
are discovered.256 If Article IV were eliminated, there would no longer 
be uncertainty if the system were to cease.257 Eliminating Article IV 
would effectively make Antarctica an unclaimable, global commons 
space.258 
D. The Solution of Meltdown 
 With the elimination of Article IV, the revised Treaty would facili-
tate agreements concerning Antarctica’s resources that truly are for 
the benefit of all nations.259 The 1959 Antarctic Treaty has as its pre-
eminent goals maintaining peace and the furtherance of scientific 
research in Antarctica and those goals should be reflected in all Ant-
arctic policies.260 Article IV, by setting aside territorial claims to the 
area, contradicts the goals of the Treaty by giving certain nations an 
incentive to maintain possible territorial claims.261 Article IV prevents 
Antarctica from truly achieving “global commons” status, since it is 
held for the benefit of all, but also potentially for the benefit of just a 
few nations with territorial claims.262 
 This solution revises the CHM principle.263 Rather than give 
every country an equal share of potential mineral resources profits in 
Antarctica, it gives all countries the greater benefit of preserving Ant-
arctica for scientific and environmental benefit for years to come.264 
The focus, therefore, is less on monetary value, which is locked up 
anyway by the Madrid Protocol, and more on aesthetic and scientific 
value, which everyone can share without cost to another.265 By deny-
ing claimant countries their territorial claims, everyone benefits from 
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the certainty of Antarctica’s continuance as a site of peace and scien-
tific study.266 
Conclusion 
 Setting territorial claims aside worked to create an initial agree-
ment on Antarctica, but it will not sustain sound future agreements. 
The international climate has changed and the environment has be-
come more important than disputed territorial claims. Facilitated by 
the absence of territorial claims, the past fifty years have seen Antarc-
tica become a peaceful and science-oriented international environ-
ment. The complete eradication of claims would guarantee that Ant-
arctica stays peaceful and scientifically viable for years to come. 
 In the wake of CRAMRA’s failure and the Madrid Protocol’s suc-
cess, it is evident that countries consider environmental issues to be of 
paramount concern in Antarctica. While granting Antarctica world 
park status could further that interest, it would contradict a very fun-
damental goal of the Antarctic Treaty: scientific research. Rather than 
declare Antarctica a world park, Treaty parties should eliminate the 
latent territorial claims in Article IV. While Antarctica has been 
treated as if it is a global commons, this would truly make Antarctica 
into a global commons space by removing any possibility of its owner-
ship by a single nation. 
 With frozen territorial claims melted, the ATS would be in a posi-
tion unlike one it has ever been in before. The frozen territorial 
claims were a barter chip for the incredible benefits of peace and sci-
entific cooperation that stemmed from the 1959 Treaty. But the ATS 
should not be chained by its beginnings, only inspired by them. With 
national interests in Antarctic territory gone, the question of what to 
do with Antarctic mineral resources (if discovered) can be answered 
from a more global, equitable perspective. 
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